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Abstract
Organisational culture is assumed to be a key factor in large-scale and avoidable institutional failures (e.g. accidents, cor-
ruption). Whilst models such as “ethical culture” and “safety culture” have been used to explain such failures, minimal 
research has investigated their ability to do so, and a single and unified model of the role of culture in institutional failures 
is lacking. To address this, we systematically identified case study articles investigating the relationship between culture 
and institutional failures relating to ethics and risk management (n = 74). A content analysis of the cultural factors leading 
to failures found 23 common factors and a common sequential pattern. First, culture is described as causing practices that 
develop into institutional failure (e.g. poor prioritisation, ineffective management, inadequate training). Second, and usually 
sequentially related to causal culture, culture is also used to describe the problems of correction: how people, in most cases, 
had the opportunity to correct a problem and avert failure, but did not take appropriate action (e.g. listening and respond-
ing to employee concerns). It was established that most of the cultural factors identified in the case studies were consistent 
with survey-based models of safety culture and ethical culture. Failures of safety and ethics also largely involve the same 
causal and corrective factors of culture, although some aspects of culture more frequently precede certain outcome types 
(e.g. management not listening to warnings more commonly precedes a loss of human life). We propose that the distinction 
between causal and corrective culture can form the basis of a unified (combining both ethical and safety culture literatures) 
and generalisable model of organisational failure.
Keywords Institutional failure · Organisational disaster · Organisational culture · Safety culture · Ethical culture · Case 
study research · Listening
Introduction
Scholars have long been interested in the role of culture 
as a causal factor in institutional failures, defined as a sig-
nificant physical, financial, or social loss (Perrow 1999; 
Rasmussen 1997; Reason 1990; Turner 1978; Vaughan 
1999). Institutional failures can be diverse in nature (e.g. 
accidents, scandals, bankruptcies), and culture is used to 
explain the shared values, beliefs, and assumptions which 
guide behaviour within an organisation and lead to poor 
outcomes (Schein 1984; Schneider et al. 2013; Ouchi and 
Wilkins 1985). Research on the cultural factors that lead to 
organisational failure has, largely, coalesced into two dis-
tinct paradigms: safety culture and ethical culture. These, 
respectively, examine how the management of risk and eth-
ics within an organisation shape attitudes (e.g. of employees 
towards incident reporting or whistleblowing) and practices 
(e.g. risk-taking, unethical conduct) that contribute to large-
scale failures (e.g. accidents, corruption) (e.g. Cooper 2000; 
Guldenmund 2000; Kaptein 2008). However, the extent to 
which theories of safety culture and ethical culture explain 
why organisational failures occur, and have identified the 
key psychological dimensions that account for problem-
atic behaviour, is nascent. This is because studies of safety 
culture and ethical culture have tended to be prospective, 
for example using cross-sectional surveys to examine the 
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relationship between employee beliefs (e.g. on norms for 
safe and ethical conduct) and behaviours (e.g. safety compli-
ance, reporting ethical breaches). The role of safety culture 
and ethical culture in causing organisational failures is less 
well-established, and we investigate this in the current arti-
cle through undertaking a systematic review of case study 
analyses using culture to understand institutional failures. 
We examine the utilisation and similarity of concepts from 
the safety and ethical culture literature to explain these fail-
ures, and propose a broader and more generalisable model 
on the role of causal and corrective organisational culture 
in institutional failures.
Organisational Culture and Its Relationship 
with Institutional Failure
There are pockets of consensus regarding how to define 
organisational culture. It is generally accepted that culture 
provides the rather stable and shared system of values, 
beliefs, and assumptions which provides approved modes of 
thought and behaviour, is resistant to change, and maintained 
through social interaction (Schall 1983; Schein 1984; Sch-
neider et al. 2013). Schein (1984) further suggests culture is 
stratified by different levels of meaning, where the deepest 
level comprises the underlying and pervasive assumptions 
which organisational members tacitly accept, the interme-
diary level comprises what they espouse to believe, and 
the highest level consists of visible or audible patterns of 
behaviour and artefacts which are a manifestation of the 
other levels. Studies of culture divide according to whether 
they orient ethnographically to organisations “as cultures,” 
or measure culture through surveys and questionnaires as a 
variable or “something an organisation has” (Smircich 1983, 
p. 347, original emphasis).
Various attributes and types of culture have been asso-
ciated with financial performance (e.g. Denison 1984; 
O’Reilly et al. 2014). Barney (1986) suggests culture can 
afford a sustained competitive advantage if characterised 
by uncommon qualities which cannot be imitated by other 
organisations. Similarity in survey responses, as an indica-
tor of cultural strength, has also been linked to performance 
(e.g. Denison 1990; Gordon and DiTomaso 1992). How-
ever, as Reason (1998) highlights, the very same processes 
of internal integration and external adaptation which main-
tain group cohesion and thus comprise the core function 
of a culture (Schein 2010) can threaten an organisation’s 
survival when applied to goals which undermine good prac-
tise. Namely, through normalising maladaptive behaviour, 
“cultures create problems as well as solving them” (Kroeber 
and Kluckhohn 1952, p. 57). This duality corresponds to 
the sub-field of sociology which draws on Merton (1936, 
1940, 1968) and Durkheim (1895/1966) to investigate how 
the same processes which produce positive organisational 
outcomes, are also responsible for the ‘dark side’ that gen-
erates mistakes, misconduct, and disaster (Vaughan 1999).
Institutional failure is “a physical, cultural, and emotional 
event incurring social loss, often possessing a dramatic qual-
ity that damages the fabric of social life” (Vaughan 1999, p. 
292). Concretely, it is typically used to refer to large-scale 
avoidable failures, for example accidents (e.g. Chernobyl, 
Deepwater Horizon) or scandals (e.g. Enron, Barings Bank), 
that have consequences for those within an organisation (e.g. 
employees), stakeholders (e.g. passengers, investors, the 
public), the environment (e.g. pollution), and integrity of 
an institution itself (e.g. collapse, or huge reputational dam-
age). Within the diverse conceptual models that are used to 
explain failure, for example by Turner (1978; Turner and 
Pidgeon 1997), Reason (1990, 2016), Perrow (1984, 1999), 
and Rasmussen (1997), organisational culture is often a key 
element.
Turner (1978) was first to describe failure as a socio-
technical phenomenon, rather than an event which is divine, 
coincidental, or purely technical (Turner and Pidgeon 1997). 
He conducted a systematic qualitative analysis of 84 Brit-
ish accident and disaster reports published between 1965 
and 1975, developing a six-stage developmental sequence 
model of failure (‘man-made disaster’) as being preceded 
by several preconditions which develop during a ‘disaster 
incubation period.’ The incubation period involves the slow 
‘accumulation’ of events which deviate from the culture’s 
beliefs and norms regarding hazards. This accumulation can 
continue for many years and is enabled by people’s incorrect 
assumptions about hazards, problems in information-han-
dling, rigidities of perception, and inappropriate or outdated 
formal procedures. The incubation period ends when a ‘pre-
cipitating incident’ such as an explosion, fire, or plunge in 
share prices, exposes the actual state of affairs. Culture is at 
the centre of Turner’s model which equates failure sociologi-
cally to a cultural collapse (Pidgeon and O’Leary 2000). Yet, 
culture operates at a meta-level in the divergence between 
what people believe is an accurate perception of affairs, and 
what is actually true. This highlights how disaster occurs 
despite people believing they are taking the necessary pre-
cautions against failure, but does not identify common ways 
in which it is precipitated by specific cultural problems.
Reason’s (1990, 2016) model of accident causation also 
considers the role of organisational culture. Reason posits 
an organisation’s layers of defence are somewhat akin to 
layers of Swiss cheese: each has gaps representing weak-
nesses, through which an accident ‘trajectory’ can pass if 
gaps momentarily align. Defence weaknesses are constantly 
moving, making their alignment—and thus failure—a rare 
occurrence (Reason 1998). Reason makes the useful dis-
tinction between the errors or violations at the ‘sharp-end’ 
of operations which ‘trigger’ failure (‘active failures’)—
the final slice in the Swiss cheese model—and the latent 
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error- and violation-producing conditions. Latent condi-
tions include for example an emphasis on cost-cutting (e.g. 
understaffing), aspects of organisational structure and how 
business is conducted, inadequate hardware in terms of tools 
and equipment, poor system design, and procedures which 
are unclear or not applicable. They persist undetected and 
are a product of culture, as well as management decisions, 
and organisational processes. However, only culture is ubiq-
uitous enough to influence all aspects of defence. Culture 
“can not only open gaps and weaknesses but also—and most 
importantly—it can allow them to remain uncorrected” 
(Reason 1998, p. 297).
Culture is less focal in Perrow’s (1984, 1999) theory of 
normal accidents which suggests failure is a normal and 
unpreventable part of organisational systems working with 
high-risk technology (e.g. nuclear power plants, air traffic 
control) because they are characterised by ‘tight coupling’ 
(e.g. little scope for slack, delays, and alternative proce-
dures) and high ‘interactive complexity’ of system compo-
nents. Perrow gives external forces of capitalism a larger role 
in failure than culture. He notes,
If culture plays a role, as many argue it does (…), it 
is not the most important one, and while efforts to 
change the culture to one that favors high reliability 
operations are certainly of high priority, restricting the 
catastrophic potential of our enterprises is of higher 
priority. (…) Rather than look to national cultures, or 
even to cultures of companies and the workplace, we 
might look at plain old free-market capitalism (Perrow 
1999, p. 416, original emphasis).
Perrow defines culture in positive terms as a source of reli-
ability, and thus does not associate culture with the nega-
tive potential of adverse outcomes. Instead, this potential 
is attributed to external production pressures of the outside 
economic system. However, the ways in which an organi-
sation manages the two opposing goals of efficiency and 
safety can shed light on what is valued and tolerated within 
an organisation (i.e. culture), and would explain why not all 
those operating in the same economic conditions experience 
failure.
Rasmussen (1997) includes culture as a possible pre-
ventative mechanism. According to Rasmussen (1997), 
organisations are constantly under pressure to maintain an 
acceptable workload, safe performance, and avoid economic 
failure. These are depicted as boundaries, where the organi-
sation is at the centre, managing the tensions between them. 
The organisation moves toward the ‘functionally acceptable’ 
(i.e. safe) performance boundary when it reduces employ-
ees’ workload or increases productivity. Errors and accidents 
occur if the organisation moves so far that it crosses the 
boundary of functionally acceptable performance. Rasmus-
sen proposes that informational campaigns for safety culture 
can counter the pressures of efficiency and thus improve 
control of performance. Safety culture is defined in terms of 
people’s knowledge of the boundary of functionally accept-
able performance. Like Perrow, this highlights the positive 
role of culture in fostering an awareness of risk and danger, 
but does not highlight the negative contributing aspects of 
culture.
In conclusion, different and seminal models of organi-
sational failure view failure as something which emerges 
gradually and sequentially over several contributing factors 
(Reason 1990; Turner 1978). Organisational culture perme-
ates these models through providing an explanatory frame-
work for understanding the drivers of behaviour within an 
organisation (e.g. the values that underlie, and are expressed, 
through cost-cutting, incentivisation, system design, proce-
dures), and explaining how norms and values towards risk 
(e.g. normalisation and tolerance) determine how managers 
and employees identify and respond to hazards. Subsequent 
research on the role of organisational culture in institutional 
failures has tended to focus on two domains: safety culture 
and ethical culture.
Safety Culture and Ethical Culture
Safety culture and ethical culture are the main cultural 
dimensions applied to investigate the relationship between 
culture and institutional failures (Cooper 2000; Guldenmund 
2000; Kaptein 2008; Treviño and Weaver 2003). Although 
they focus on different sets of values (e.g. the importance of 
safety, adhering to ethical standards), behaviours (e.g. risk-
taking, dishonesty), and outcomes (e.g. accidents, scandals), 
safety culture and ethical culture have many parallels in how 
they are used to explain organisational failures. For instance, 
both stress the importance of senior leadership in setting 
standards, supervisors in guiding behaviour, organisational 
and group norms in determining what practices are accept-
able, giving employees the knowledge and skills to behave 
effectively, and ensuring employees can speak-up (and are 
listened to) when they raise concerns (Ardichvili and Jondle 
2009; Guldenmund 2000; Kaptein 2011; Neal and Griffin 
2002; Reader and O’Connor 2014; Zohar 2010). However, 
both models diverge in their origins, and the variables they 
use to explain organisational failures.
Interest in safety culture came from a shift in focus 
from models of causation to how crisis and risk manage-
ment might be improved to provide institutional resilience 
(Pidgeon and O’Leary 2000). Safety culture relates to the 
norms and practises surrounding health and safety within 
an organisation (Cooper 2000; Guldenmund 2000), and is 
highly related to safety climate (perceptions on the prior-
ity of safety) (Zohar 2010). Pidgeon and O’Leary (2017) 
suggest a ‘good’ safety culture is characterised by senior 
management’s commitment to safety, a shared concern for 
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hazards and how they impact people, realistic norms and 
procedures for managing risk, and continual processes of 
reflection and organisational learning. Safety culture gained 
traction in the 1980s to account for large-scale failures such 
as the Chernobyl nuclear disaster (Pidgeon 1998) and Piper 
Alpha oil rig explosion (1993) where shared patterns of 
belief and behaviour were found to have played a signifi-
cant role in the disasters. In both cases, a prioritisation of 
other concerns (e.g. productivity) by senior managers led 
to operational decisions that weakened safety (e.g. on the 
use of resources, reduced safety inspections, pushing safety 
capabilities), the normalisation of unsafe practices (e.g. 
unsupervised staff undertaking maintenance routines), and 
a lack of preparedness for managing safety emergencies. By 
focussing accident investigations on the system and cultural 
context of organisations, safety culture theory departed from 
earlier research which had attributed accidents to fallible 
mental processes (e.g. forgetfulness, negligence) in individu-
als working directly with the system (Reason 2000). Rather, 
safety is understood as part of an organisation’s value-sys-
tem, with the consideration of safety in everyday practices 
being a product of, and revealing, these values (Guldenmund 
2000).
Interest in the domain of ethical culture has come about 
due to organisational failures that are considered a conse-
quence of unethical conduct (e.g. scandals of Enron, LIBOR, 
and Odebrecht). Similar to safety culture, the concept of 
ethical culture emerges from the rationale that unethical 
acts within an organisation are likely to reflect values within 
an organisation for ethical conduct, rather than individual 
failings. This diverges from the perspective that unethi-
cal behaviour is determined by individual factors such as 
a person’s sensitivity to moral issues (Rest 1979), level of 
moral judgement (Kohlberg 1969), and guilt proneness 
(e.g. Cohen et al. 2012). Within the ethical culture frame-
work, ethical behaviour is conceptualised as determined by 
immediate job pressures, institutional values and norms on 
the importance of ethics (e.g. for indicating the appropri-
ateness of behaviours), and the embedding of these values 
into formal systems (e.g. rules and polices) (Treviño 1986; 
Treviño et al. 2014). As with safety culture, ethical culture 
is conceptualised as a subset of organisational culture, with 
specific domains of activity—for instance on transparency 
or the sanctioning of unethical behaviour—constituting an 
ethical culture (Kaptein 2008; Kish-Gephart et al. 2010). 
Furthermore, ethical culture is influenced by the values and 
behaviours of leaders (see Ardichvili and Jondle 2009), 
and associated through various dimensions with reported 
(un)ethical behaviour and intentions (e.g. Kaptein 2011; 
Sweeney et al. 2010; Zaal et al. 2019). Several contributing 
factors to ethical culture have been identified, including an 
organisational commitment to employees (Fernández and 
Camacho 2016), the presence of ethics programmes such 
as a dedicated ethics department or committee (Martineau 
et al. 2017), the role-modelling of ethical practises by man-
agement (Kaptein 2011), and reward systems that reinforce 
ethical behaviour (Treviño et al. 1998). Ethical climate, 
understood as the perceptions of organisational values for 
ethics (Victor and Cullen 1988), has been distinguished from 
ethical culture, which relates more to the systems of control 
that shape ethical behaviour (Kaptein 2011; Treviño et al. 
1998). As the dimensions of ethical culture and ethical cli-
mate are highly related (Treviño et al. 1998), we, like others 
(e.g. Ardichvili and Jondle 2009), regard ethical climate as 
a sub-category of ethical culture.
The fields of both safety culture and ethical culture have 
arisen to explain organisational failures, and to investigate 
this, researchers in both fields have relied on psychometri-
cally validated surveys (Guldenmund 2007; Kaptein 2008). 
These are used to measure employee perceptions of the 
culture (e.g. management commitment to safety, reporting 
safety incidents, clarity of expected conduct, reporting ethi-
cal concerns), with responses being associated at an indi-
vidual, unit, or organisational level with adverse outcomes. 
For instance, research shows safety culture to be associated 
with safety behaviours, reporting, and lost-time injuries 
(Beus et al. 2016; Christian et al. 2009; Petitta et al. 2017), 
and ethical culture to be associated with ethical choices and 
reports of unethical behaviours (e.g. intentions to report mis-
conduct) (Schaubroeck et al. 2012; Kish-Gephart et al. 2010; 
Kaptein 2011). Associations between safety culture and ethi-
cal culture and larger-scale organisational failures (e.g. cor-
ruption, process safety failures) are absent due to their rar-
ity (e.g. in comparison to individual reports on behaviour), 
unpredictability (e.g. in identifying and accessing a failing 
organisation), and the challenges of expecting employees to 
recognise and report on sensitive topics like safety and ethics 
(e.g. Antonsen 2009a; Arnold and Feldman 1981; Fischer 
and Fick 1993). Furthermore, whilst survey methods have 
provided valuable insight on ‘what’ cultural dimensions are 
associated with adverse outcomes, they have not necessarily 
shown ‘how’ various aspects of culture interact to create the 
conditions for failure. This is important because failure is 
defined by the nature of its sequential development through 
several events over time (Reason 1990; Turner 1978).
In summary, researchers have provided and validated 
conceptual models for measuring safety culture and ethical 
culture, and these models are the most widely used to under-
stand the cultural conditions under which institutional fail-
ures occur. However, for reasons of methodology and data 
availability, both concepts are limited in the extent to which 
their underlying components are demonstrated and under-
stood (e.g. in terms of sequence within an event) to have 
a role in explaining large-scale and avoidable institutional 
failures (e.g. accidents, scandals). Indeed, it is not clear 
that safety culture and ethical culture are entirely distinct 
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in explaining failure: for example, investigations of hospital 
failures in the UK (e.g. Mid Staffordshire hospital, Shrews-
bury and Telford hospital) have revealed a combination of 
poor safety culture (e.g. staff not reporting on sub-stand-
ard care) and poor ethical culture (e.g. dismissing patient 
concerns, concealing poor care) to have led to unnecessary 
patient deaths (Francis 2013; Lintern 2019). There may be 
aspects of organisational culture important for explaining 
institutional failures that are generalisable and not unique 
to either safety culture or ethical culture (e.g. reporting on 
concerns), or factors that are not considered within either 
model. To better explain the role of organisational culture 
in institutional failures, and specifically the contribution of 
safety culture and ethical culture, we undertake a systematic 
review of articles investigating the relationship between cul-
ture and institutional failures.
Current Study
In this study, we undertake an inductive content analysis 
of case studies investigating the role of organisational cul-
ture in institutional failures. Case study analyses draw on a 
multitude of secondary sources to understand causes of an 
institutional failure, including investigative reports, organi-
sational documents, as well as first-person accounts, which 
only become available after a failure because of a need to 
establish what occurred (Cox and Flin 1998; Feagin et al. 
1991). This mitigates the previously mentioned limitations 
with survey-based methods, and supports an approach which 
can consider the perspectives of all people and sub-cultures 
involved, enabling analysis of ‘how’ culture led to failure 
(Glendon and Stanton 2000; Tellis 1997). Given these meth-
odological affordances, case studies may provide insight 
on the most commonly identified aspects of safety culture 
and ethical culture that underlie organisational failures, 
alongside identifying cultural factors not established within 
survey-based models of safety culture and ethical culture. 
Moreover, their inductive and retrospective nature offers 
the opportunity to determine whether failures of safety and 
ethics differ by the cultural factors they involve, or if the 
conceptual boundaries of safety culture and ethical culture 
become less distinct when considering failure. In this study, 
we systematically identify and analyse case studies of insti-
tutional failure in order to address four research questions. 
We define institutional failure as an event with multiple 
causes which had developed over time (Turner 1978; Turner 
and Pidgeon 1997).
First, we identify and extract the aspects of organisational 
culture reported as contributing to institutional failures. Our 
aim is to determine whether a common set of cultural fac-
tors can be established—from across the multiple and inde-
pendent case studies—as leading to institutional failure. We 
think that establishing what cultural factors have been used 
to explain failure provides a logical starting point for our 
analysis because these cultural factors have not been sys-
tematically catalogued before and it will enable comparisons 
with existing models of safety culture, ethical culture, and 
failure.
Second, we examine how different cultural factors are 
used to explain institutional failure. We explore whether, 
as specified in various models of institutional failure (e.g. 
Reason 1990; Turner 1978), culture is used to both account 
for the organisational conditions that underlie failure (e.g. 
norms, values), and problems in responding to threats that 
endanger an organisation (e.g. a developing accident). This 
exploration of how culture is used to explain failure will 
shed light on the mechanisms by which culture contributes 
to failure. These mechanisms are beyond the scope of sur-
vey-based methods which measure cultural elements to the 
degree that they are present or absent (see Reason 2000).
Third, we consider the cultural factors identified in case 
studies of institutional failure in relation to the safety cul-
ture and ethical culture models. We investigate the extent 
to which the cultural factors identified by analyses of insti-
tutional failure map onto existing models of safety culture 
and ethical culture. We identify cultural factors not typically 
included with models of safety culture and ethical culture, 
and consider whether they indicate other aspects of organi-
sational culture which may be important for explaining insti-
tutional failure. As a third step, this establishes the extent 
to which retrospective studies diverge from survey-based 
studies of safety culture and ethical culture.
Fourth, we examine whether the cultural factors identi-
fied as contributing to institutional failures vary according 
to failure-type (safety or ethics) and failure-outcome (e.g. 
loss of life, environmental damage). Here, we are interested 
in the extent to which models of safety culture and ethical 
culture are exclusive and explanatory of institutional fail-
ures, or whether a more generalisable model of institutional 
failure might be derived.
Method
This is the first systematic review of case studies which use 
culture to account for the causation of institutional failure. 
Accordingly, there was no protocol available and the devel-
opment of search terms was challenging given the literature 
on culture and failure is ill-defined and prone to differences 
in terminology. For stage 1, search terms were designed to 
ensure the primacy of organisational culture as a theoreti-
cal framework (see Fig. 1). Using Scopus and Web of Sci-
ence, studies were identified if ‘organisational culture’ or an 
equivalent term (e.g. ‘organisational climate’) based on Sch-
neider et al. (2013) featured in the title, and ‘failure’ or an 
equivalent term (e.g. ‘disaster’) featured in the title, abstract, 
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or keywords. No date parameters were applied. Assessing 
the output revealed some issues with this first search. First, 
limiting the occurrence of ‘culture’ to title only included 
some studies not found otherwise, but excluded publications 
which mention culture only in the abstract or keywords. Sec-
ond, studies which refer only to ‘culture’ or ‘climate’ were 
not identified because the search terms required more speci-
ficity (i.e. ‘organisational culture’). Third, it was evident that 
several studies name a high-profile failure rather than use a 
generic term like ‘failure.’
For stage 2, the search for ‘organisational culture’ and 
‘failure’ was expanded to keywords in Scopus, and title, 
abstract, and keywords in Web of Science. Studies were also 
identified if they specified failures (e.g. ‘Challenger’) in key-
words (Scopus) or title, abstract, and keywords (Web of Sci-
ence), or if they used specific text strings such as ‘culture at’ 
and ‘learn* from’ in the title or abstract (Scopus) and title, 
abstract, and keywords (Web of Science). Books and book 
chapters were initially included in this second Scopus search 
given knowledge of some seminal publications in the field 
(e.g. Vaughan 1996), but ultimately screened out for a more 
manageable extraction process. Differences in search fields 
across databases are owing to differences in search capabili-
ties of Scopus and Web of Science. After removal of 771 
duplicates, the final corpus consisted of 3,491 publications. 
The same search terms without the inclusion of ‘culture’ 
or ‘climate’ yielded 18,419 articles in Web of Science, and 
thus we can estimate that about 23% of case study research 
on organisational failure utilises culture concepts. Through 
screening of titles and abstracts, studies were included if 
they contained a case study of one or more institutional fail-
ures and employed organisational culture as a main theoreti-
cal framework. A hand search was conducted to ensure no 
relevant case studies had been omitted, and this led to the 
addition of articles by Bennett (2020), Merenda and Irwin 
(2018), Jung and Park (2017), and Reason (1998). The final 
corpus consisted of 58 articles.
Data Extraction and Analysis
The full-text of included articles was retrieved and extraction 
was carried out according to the four research questions. To 
establish what cultural factors are cited as contributing to 
institutional failure, a content analysis of included articles 
Fig. 1  Procedure for study 
selection
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was carried out at the sentence-level. “Content analysis is 
a research technique for making replicable and valid infer-
ences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts 
of their use” (Krippendorff 2013, p. 24). This content analy-
sis was inductive because no pre-existing model of culture 
or climate was used to identify the cultural factors cited by 
case studies. Avoiding pre-conceived cultural factors was 
considered important for methodological integrity given the 
untraditional nature of this review. Cultural factors were col-
lapsed based on similarity over three rounds of consolidation 
into 23 categories.
To establish how case studies use cultural factors to 
explain failure, each factor was additionally coded for the 
presence of preceding cultural causes and subsequent cul-
tural outcomes (i.e. which it elicited or supported). Cultural 
factors were not double-coded unless they indexed distinct 
values or behaviours, and where it was necessary to cap-
ture the unconnected causes or outcomes of a single cultural 
factor.
To establish whether the cultural factors identified in case 
studies correspond to the items and dimensions of models of 
safety culture and ethical culture, we examined two reviews 
of safety culture and climate scales (Flin et al. 2000; Gul-
denmund 2000), two widely-cited models of ethical culture 
(Kaptein 2008; Treviño et al. 1998), and conducted addi-
tional literature searches where a cultural factor was not cap-
tured by these resources (e.g. Hessels and Wurmser 2020; 
Singhapakdi et al. 1996).
Finally, each failure analysed was coded according to 
type (i.e. safety or ethics) and outcome (e.g. environmental 
damage). The cultural factors cited in relation to each fail-
ure type and outcome were examined for patterns to see if 
any cultural factors are exclusively involved in safety failures 
or ethical failures and whether some aspects of culture more 
frequently precede specific failure outcomes.
Results
Fifty-eight articles containing 74 case studies of 57 unique 
institutional failures were identified. The most common jour-
nal of publication was Safety Science (12.07%, n = 7; see 
“Appendix”). The culture models of safety culture (36.21%, 
n = 21), organisational culture (17.24%, n = 10), and corpo-
rate culture (13.79%, n = 8) were most frequent. Overall, 
the failures investigated were diverse, including: nuclear 
disasters, oil rig explosions, doping in professional sport, 
financial fraud, failures to adapt, poor planning, accidents 
in public transport, the hiring of incompetent staff, institu-
tional abuse, espionage, hazardous spills, and fires. Case 
studies analysed failures of safety (55.41%, n = 41), ethics 
(41.89%, n = 31) and a third category of strategy (2.7% of 
case studies, n = 2).
Case studies predominantly investigated fraud (27.03%, 
n = 20), oil and gas spills (12.16%, n = 9), space shuttle dis-
asters (12.16%, n = 9), nuclear disasters (8.11%, n = 6), and 
rail accidents (6.76%, n = 5). Recurrent failures were the 
accounting fraud at Enron (8.11%, n = 6), the disintegra-
tion of the Space Shuttle Columbia as it was entering the 
atmosphere (6.76%, n = 5), the disintegration of the Space 
Shuttle Challenger at 73 s after it lifted-off (5.41%, n = 4), 
and the Fukushima nuclear disaster (5.41%, n = 4). Overall, 
case studies spanned 15 sectors. Ten were encompassed by 
the Global Industry Classification Standard (MSCI and S&P 
Global Market Intelligence 2018) (see Fig. 2).
Establishing Whether a Common Set of Cultural 
Factors Contribute to Failure
To establish whether case studies identify a common set 
of cultural factors, we systematically coded and collapsed 
all cultural factors invoked by case studies. Twenty-three 
cultural factors were identified as contributing to failure, 
indicating that failure arises from a generally common set 
of values and practises (see Table 1).
Priorities
The most common cultural factor was a problem in how 
priorities were ranked within the organisation. This pre-
dominantly involved safety or ethics being less prioritised in 
favour of profitability or productivity. For example, a focus 
on production at a meat supplier motivated poor hygiene 
practises and the repackaging of expired meat products, 
eventually causing a tragic E. coli O157 outbreak in South 
Wales (Griffith 2010). The focus on profit could also mani-
fest as aggressiveness and an orientation towards competi-
tiveness. At Enron, the lowest performing employees were 
annually let go in a ‘rank and yank system’ which created 
a ‘cut-throat’ culture of competition between employees 
that normalised accounting fraud (Cuong 2011; Froud et al. 
2004). In all cases, productivity had short-term benefits with 
unforeseen long-term outcomes. This is illustrated by Rea-
son (1998) who describes how competition between British 
warships in nineteenth century peacetime led to polishing 
practises which removed the watertight quality of doors, 
contributing to naval disasters such as the HMS Camper-
down. As Reason (1998) notes, “peacetime ‘display culture’ 
not only undermined the Royal Navy’s fighting ability, it also 
created gleaming death traps” (p. 298). Being the most prev-
alent cultural factor in failure, it would be useful to know its 
preconditions. However, in the few cases where an underly-
ing cause was given, the failure to prioritise safety and ethics 
was the outcome of forces outside an organisation’s control, 
including societal or national norms (e.g. neoliberalism; 
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Fig. 2  Case studies of institu-
tional failure according to the 
Global Industry Classifica-
tion Standard (GICS) with the 
additions of ‘Space explora-
tion,’ ‘Government’, ‘Profes-
sional sports,’ ‘Education’, and 
‘Military’
Table 1  Cultural factors which contribute to institutional failure in descending order
Cultural factors Definition Percent of case studies
Priorities Safety or ethics are not prioritised, often in favour of productivity or profitability 50 (n = 37)
Management Inadequate management in terms of business strategy, managerial style, or auditing and 
checking of work
45.95 (n = 34)
Training and policy Training or policy for procedure is inadequate or absent 36.49 (n = 27)
Listening Warnings (verbal information or physical signs) are not heeded or employee input is 
excluded from decision-making
33.78 (n = 25)
Disbelief It is not believed that institutional failure is possible 28.38 (n = 21)
Procedure Procedure is violated 28.38 (n = 21)
Speaking-up Employees do not speak-up about problems 28.38 (n = 21)
Problem response The response to a warning about a problem is inadequate 27.03 (n = 20)
Problem acceptance Problems are accepted 24.32 (n = 18)
Regulation Regulation or independent auditing is inadequate or absent 21.62 (n = 16)
Resources Resources (qualified staff, equipment, and environment) are inadequate or absent 21.62 (n = 16)
Teamwork Teamwork is inhibited by hierarchy, poor communication or siloing 21.62 (n = 16)
Satisfaction Morale (low/high), trust (low/high), and fatigue of workforce 18.92 (n = 14)
Bullying Bullying or possibility of bullying by management or other employees 14.86 (n = 11)
Learning Past incidents have not been learnt from 14.86 (n = 11)
Role-modelling Unethical or unsafe behaviour is role-modelled by management 14.86 (n = 11)
External environment National norms, legislation, political pressures, or public funding restrictions 13.51 (n = 10)
Rhetoric Managerial rhetoric renders a problem acceptable 13.51 (n = 10)
Supervision Supervision of the organisation by the board of directors is inadequate 13.51 (n = 10)
Homogeneity Values or practises are widely shared by a homogenous workforce 12.16 (n = 9)
Planning Planning and long-term thinking are inadequate or absent 10.81 (n = 8)
Speaking-up system Lack of a system through which to speak-up about problems 9.46 (n = 7)
Change Institutional change in terms of new management, privatisation, or technology 6.76 (n = 5)
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Behling et al. 2019; Kee et al. 2017), privatisation (Dien 
et al. 2004), and legislation (Behling et al. 2019).
Management
Inadequate management was also a common cultural fac-
tor. Occasionally this involved aspects of leadership style 
and personality, such as the CEO being distant and una-
vailable to employees (Johnson 2008), exhibiting exces-
sive confidence (Amernic and Craig 2013; Cervellati et al. 
2013), divisiveness or dogmatism (Fallon and Cooper 2015). 
It also involved leaders pursuing inappropriate business 
strategies, such as undercutting competitors, resulting in 
an artificial market monopoly (Goh et al. 2010). However, 
inadequate management more frequently involved managers 
and supervisors not verifying that procedures and jobsites 
(i.e. operating standards) were maintained by employees. It 
also manifested in overly generous reward structures which 
encouraged unethical behaviour (e.g. Froud et al. 2004; 
Molina 2018). The large role attributed management must be 
considered in relation to inadequate board supervision which 
was less frequently cited. It may be that board effectiveness 
and composition are less consequential than adequate execu-
tive management to the prevention of adverse events (cf. 
Baysinger and Butler 1985; Uzun et al. 2004).
Training and Policy
The many problems related to training and policy reflect 
Reason’s (1990) idea that failure is triggered by the errors or 
violations of individuals dealing immediately with the sys-
tem (Reason 1990; see also Robson et al. 2012; Schulte et al. 
2003). Indeed, inadequate training of employees resulted in 
a workforce which lacked the ability to properly carry out 
tasks, causing behaviour that precipitated or facilitated fail-
ure. Unsurprisingly, inadequate training was often the out-
come of cultural factors which reduced its apparent neces-
sity, including cost-cutting and a focus on profit (e.g. Froud 
et al. 2004; MacLean et al. 2004), insufficient regulation 
(e.g. Crofts 2017; Kim et al. 2018), and a shared belief that 
failure was not possible anyway (e.g. Cervellati et al. 2013, 
1993; Reason 1998). For example, operators at Chernobyl 
had not been effectively trained in the dangers of nuclear 
power, and thus did not exercise appropriate caution (Reason 
1998).
Problems of policy related to the content or availability 
of information about organisational procedures (e.g. Rafeld 
et al. 2019; Reader and O’Connor 2014). On the one hand, 
overly-proscriptive policy could deter employees from vio-
lating procedure even when a situation demanded it (e.g. 
Broadribb 2015). For example, a stringent culture of proce-
dural compliance deterred the pilots of Swissair flight 111 
from landing the aircraft as quickly as possible when inflight 
smoke was detected (McCall and Pruchnicki 2017). Policy 
could also give license to unethical practise through vague-
ness. As Sims and Brinkmann (2002) note, “[w]hen people 
are not sure what to do, unethical behaviour may flourish as 
aggressive individuals pursue what they believe to be accept-
able” (p. 334).
Change
Institutional change was the least-cited contributing factor 
to failure, indicating that failure may be more commonly the 
outcome of enduring beliefs and behaviour. Change contrib-
uted to failure where it clashed with or weakened an existing 
culture, for example a new CEO was a poor cultural fit (e.g. 
Johnson 2008) or administrative changes disrupted employ-
ees’ accustomed occupational roles (Lederman et al. 2015).
Speaking‑Up System and Bullying
The availability of a medium was not the most important 
factor in employees speaking-up about problems to man-
agement. Case studies more frequently attributed employee 
silence to a fear of victimisation from bullying (e.g. Crofts 
2017; Johnson 2008; Froud et al. 2004) and material retali-
ation such as being fired (e.g. Beamish 2000; Guthrie and 
Shayo 2005). This reflects the health problems associated 
with being bullied at work (e.g. Nielsen and Einarsen 2012; 
Einarsen and Skogstad 1996) and suggests that organisa-
tional responses to whistle-blowers are an important deter-
minant of speaking-up behaviour.
Establishing whether Culture is Used in the Dynamic 
Sense of Failure Models
To establish whether usage of the concept of culture was 
congruent with the dynamic failure models of Reason (1998) 
and Turner (1978), we counted the number of factors cited 
and coded for possible sequential relationships between 
them. With a mean of 7.28 cultural factors cited per case 
study, usage of culture was in line with these failure mod-
els. Cultural factors were also frequently linked sequentially 
(87.84%, n = 65) and case studies typically cited more than 
one sequence of cultural factors (59.46%, n = 44). This 
reflects popular models of failure development which sug-
gest the complex and dynamic nature of failure develop-
ment (Reason 1990; Turner 1978) and is a divergence from 
survey-based studies of safety culture and ethical culture 
which commonly measure culture by its absence (see Rea-
son 2000).
Sequences of cultural factors tended to consist of two 
cultural factors (77.03%, n = 57). Fewer case studies cited 
sequences of three (22.97%, n = 17), four (2.7%, n = 2), 
five (1.35%, n = 1), and six cultural factors (1.35%, n = 1). 
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Importantly, sequential cultural factors were not necessarily 
consecutive. For example, in a case study of the Piper Alpha 
oil rig explosion, it was the combination of (a) inadequate 
regulation, (b) the primacy of production, and (c) disbelief 
that failure was possible, which together led to (d) design 
decisions that created (e) an unsafe physical work environ-
ment ( Paté-Cornell 1993).
Case studies used culture to explain failure in two ways. 
Most often culture described problematic values and prac-
tises that were endogenous to the culture and directly con-
tributed to failure (93.24% of case studies, n = 69). This 
encompassed 15 of the 23 cultural factors, including: 
change, disbelief, employee satisfaction, the external envi-
ronment, homogeneity, planning, priorities, procedure, man-
agement, regulation, resources, role-modelling, supervision, 
teamwork, and training and policy. These cultural factors can 
create the preconditions for failure to occur. Although we 
are not suggesting a new concept, they can be grouped into 
the category of ‘causal culture’ for ease of interpretation.
Culture was also used to explain why an organisation 
failed to correct a problem before it was able to develop 
into failure (72.97% of case studies, n = 54). Issues of cor-
rective culture manifested as ‘problems dealing with prob-
lems.’ This encompassed eight of the 23 cultural factors, 
including: bullying, listening, learning, problem accept-
ance, problem response, rhetoric, speaking-up, and speak-
ing-up system. These may be organised into the two cat-
egories of voicing and hearing. Voicing factors refer to the 
failure of employees to voice concerns about institutional 
problems to people in authority. Hearing factors refer to 
the failure by management to act on information received 
about institutional problems. This distinction maps onto 
the two critical phases of an organisation’s ‘adaptive 
capacity’: first, disruptive events need to be identified and 
relayed appropriately, and second, information must be 
heeded with the proper deployment of resources (Bur-
nard and Bhamra 2011). Problems of corrective culture 
are distinct from other cultural factors because they do 
not advance the development of a failure. Instead, they 
represent missed opportunities to address a problem and 
potentially avert failure.
Case studies cite an average of 4.99 causal cultural factors 
and 2.3 corrective cultural factors. As depicted in Fig. 3, 
the maximum number of causal and corrective factors cited 
by any case study is 17 and nine, respectively. Twenty case 
studies (27.03%) cite only causal factors, whilst five case 
studies (6.76%) describe failure arising from corrective fac-
tors alone. Indeed, 66.22 percent of case studies describe a 
combination of causal and corrective cultural factors. This 
indicates that failure commonly involves more aspects of 
causal culture, but that failure is typically also preceded by 
at least one missed opportunity to avert failure.
In summary, where studies of safety culture and ethical 
culture have prospectively measured culture through the 
perceptions of organisational members, case studies have 
retrospectively analysed how cultural factors interact in a 
sequential way to produce failure. Case studies thus reveal 
that, rather than exerting a top-down influence on behaviour, 
cultural factors divide according to whether they represent 
causes of failure or missed opportunities to avert failure. 
Indeed, a majority of case studies highlight that failures 
could have been prevented.
Fig. 3  Frequency of causal and 
corrective cultural factors by 
case study
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Establishing How Retrospective Case Studies 
Diverge from Survey‑based Models of Safety Culture 
and Ethical Culture
Twenty of the 23 cultural factors which contribute to fail-
ure are typically part of models of safety culture (Flin et al. 
2000; Guldenmund 2000; Hessels and Wurmser 2020) or 
ethical culture (Kaptein 2008; Singhapakdi et al. 1996; 
Treviño et al. 1998) (see Table 2). This indicates that case 
study analyses and survey-based studies largely overlap in 
the cultural factors they identify. However, three cultural 
factors—listening, bullying, and homogeneity—were novel, 
and are important to identify.
Listening is not typically measured by survey-based 
studies of safety culture and ethical culture. This is note-
worthy given that a failure to listen to signs or information 
about problems is mentioned by a third of case studies. A 
diverse literature outside of culture recognises the impor-
tance of listening in organisations (e.g. Gillespie and Reader 
2016). Some draw on the Foucauldian concept of ‘parrhe-
sia’ (true speech) to analyse whistleblowing and listening 
(e.g. Catlaw et al. 2014; Vandekerckhove and Langenberg 
2012; Weiskopf and Tobias-Miersch 2016). For instance, 
Vandekerckhove and Langenberg (2012) suggest that par-
rhesia in the workplace may not be heard because informa-
tion typically travels up a hierarchy, requiring that a series of 
people have the courage to speak-up to the next person above 
them. Others use the term ‘deaf effect’ to understand when 
organisations persist with projects despite reports of trou-
ble (Cueller et al. 2006; Keil and Robey 1999). Jones and 
Kelly (2014) suggest that when whistle-blowers are listened 
to, it can create a mutually-reinforcing cycle that benefits 
organisational learning, whilst ‘organisational disregard’ can 
create a norm of silence, preventing people from coming 
forward about other issues (see also Mannion and Davies 
2018). Burris (2012) focusses on the information commu-
nicated and finds that managers are more likely to agree 
with information that supports rather than challenges the 
organisation’s goals, and that this relationship is mediated 
by the perceived loyalty and threat of voicing employees. 
Perceptions of management listening have also been linked 
to psychological safety and creativity (Castro et al. 2018).
The case studies indicate that not listening (i.e. not heed-
ing information) was the outcome of culture in two ways 
(see Table 3 for examples). First, not listening occurred 
because the information received (i.e. X is unsafe or 
Table 2  Correspondence 
between cultural factors and 
dimensions in literature
These items are in bold to highlight that they are novel





Causal factors Change Present Not present
Disbelief Not present Present
External environment Present Not present
Homogeneity Not present Not present
Management Present Present
Planning Present Not present
Priorities Present Present
Procedure Present Not present
Regulation Present Not present
Resources Present Present
Role-modelling Not present Present
Satisfaction Present Present
Supervision Not present Present
Teamwork Present Not present
Training and policy Present Present
Corrective factors Bullying Not present Not present
Learning Present Not present
Listening Not present Not present
Problem acceptance Present Not present
Problem response Present Not present
Rhetoric Present Present
Speaking-up Present Present
Speaking-up system Present Not present
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unethical) conflicted with the receiver’s taken-for-granted 
assumptions about the world as a cultural member (i.e. X 
is safe, X is ethical, or failure cannot happen), resulting in 
a breakdown of intersubjectivity (e.g. Grice 1975). Choo 
(2008) refers to this misalignment between information 
and available cognitive frame as an ‘epistemic blindspot.’ 
In terms of excluding employees from decision-making, 
this misalignment could cause employee involvement to 
be regarded as extraneous. Second, not listening occurred 
because the information, whilst decoded ‘correctly’ in 
terms of intent and content, conflicted with competing 
cultural values and demands. These include a pressure to 
maintain performance levels (e.g. Broadribb 2015; Mason 
2004) and having to manage with limited resources (e.g. 
MacLean et al. 2004). Competing values and demands 
may also account for those cases where managers excluded 
employees from decision-making. Involving employees 
may conflict with organisational goals if employees com-
municate inconvenient information or deplete valued time.
Bullying is the second cultural factor not typically a part of 
models of safety culture and ethical culture. Bullying deterred 
employees from speaking-up about organisational problems 
(e.g. Dimeo 2014; Patrick et al. 2018). Bullying had pragmatic 
qualities somewhat similar to gossip: it was a form of social 
control directed at someone perceived to have transgressed 
the rules, which seemed to reinforce the group’s normative 
boundaries of right and wrong (Gluckman 1963; see also 
Waddington 2016). Bullying is naturally more hostile than 
gossip, and was indelibly dysfunctional because it enabled 
unsafe or unethical practises to persist and remain acceptable 
to (most) group members. As such bullying can have adverse 
outcomes for organisations, as well as individuals (e.g. self-
esteem, Randle 2003; job satisfaction, Quine 1999).
The final cultural factor not typically a part of models of 
safety culture and ethical culture is workforce homogeneity 
(i.e. the absence of diversity). In the case studies, homogeneity 
was predominantly fostered through recruitment and promo-
tion practises which rewarded unethical behaviour with a sense 
of belonging (Crawford et al. 2017) or (continued) employ-
ment (Fallon and Cooper 2015; Sims and Brinkmann 2002, 
2003). Homogeneity has been studied as a source of cultural 
strength, associated with more reliable performance in stable 
environments (Sørensen 2002), job satisfaction, organisational 
commitment, and less role stress (Barnes et al. 2006). Con-
versely, diversity research shows that demographic diversity 
amongst members of the board and management has a posi-
tive effect on financial performance (e.g. Erhardt et al. 2003), 
promotes cognitive diversity (see Horwitz 2005), and mitigates 
groupthink (Janis 1972). Indeed, strongly shared values and 
norms can be maladaptive (Syed 2019), but there is need to 
further conceptualise homogeneity as a cultural phenomenon 
that is conducive to failure.
In summary, whilst the cultural factors identified by case 
studies largely map onto models of safety culture and ethical 
culture, listening, bullying, and homogeneity as cultural phe-
nomena need further research as they relate to adverse organi-
sational events. However, the large overlap suggests failure and 
less severe events arise from a common set of cultural factors.
Establishing whether Cultural Factors vary 
by Failure and Outcome Type
Cultural Factors by Failure‑Type
To establish whether the 23 cultural factors occur across 
safety and ethical failures, we examined the distribution 
Table 3  A summary of the cultural factors not typically a part of models of safety culture and ethical culture and how they relate to culture
Cultural factor Relationship to culture Example
Listening Information is not listened to because it conflicts with taken-
for-granted assumptions
Strauch (2015) describes how the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation (FBI) for a long time took no action on information 
regarding possible espionage. When it finally took action, it 
wrongly focussed its investigation on the CIA for years. This 
response suggests the concept of an FBI spy was too at odds 
with FBI culture to accept.
Information does not translate into action because of compet-
ing values and demands in the cultural context
Antonsen (2009b) describes how at NASA, the value placed on 
productivity led to the launch of the Space Shuttle Challenger 
despite whistle-blowers raising concerns about the effect of 
cold weather on the integrity of O-rings used to seal joints.
Bullying Bullying deterred employees from speaking-up about organi-
sational problems which could render an organisation’s 
accepted practises unacceptable (i.e. unsafe or unethical) or 
make failure a possibility where it had seemed impossible 
before
Froud et al. (2004) describe how at Enron, the value placed on 
the bottom-line over ethical practises led to the risk manage-
ment department being bullied by management, obstructing 
its ability to effectively audit the company and thus bring to 
light the accounting fraud.
Homogeneity Maladaptive values and norms are widely shared by a homog-
enous workforce
Fallon and Cooper (2015) describe how a new CEO not only 
hired those who emulated his own qualities but also brought 
several employees with him from his previous job.
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of cultural factors by failure type. All causal and correc-
tive factors occurred at least once in both failure  types, 
with the exception of inadequate board supervision which 
was exclusive to ethical failures. A few more discrepancies 
emerge when frequencies are scaled against the different 
proportions of safety failures and ethical failures (see Figs. 4 
and 5). Safety failures more often involved issues related 
to the external environment, learning, listening, proce-
dure, resources, and teamwork. Ethical failures more often 
involved issues related to bullying, employee satisfaction 
(e.g. extremes of morale and trust), homogeneity, manage-
ment, problem acceptance, problem response, regulation, 
rhetoric, role-modelling, speaking-up, speaking-up system, 
and training and policy. 
Cultural Factors by Outcome Type
When the tallies of cultural factors are scaled against the 
outcomes they precipitated (i.e. tallied by outcome type and 
divided by the total number of case studies investigating 
that outcome type), some tentative patterns can be discerned 
(see Fig. 6). First, the cultural factor of listening most often 
occurred in failures which resulted in a loss of human life 
(e.g. accidents of public transport, the NASA space shuttle 
disasters). Second, deficiencies in regulation and training 
and policy most often preceded failures that could have 
long-term health consequences for workers or the public 
(e.g. Chernobyl, Three Mile Island) or which caused envi-
ronmental damage (e.g. oil spill from Deepwater Horizon). 
Third, inadequate management, supervision, homogeneity 
and role-modelling most frequently preceded administrative 
outcomes which caused financial loss and/or damage to an 
organisation’s brand through scandal (e.g. doping in sports).
Discussion
Implications of this Review for Models of Failure
This review analysed 58 publications which use case study 
methods to investigate how organisational culture contrib-
utes to institutional failures. The findings advance existing 
models of failure in three ways. First, we found that case 
studies identify 23 contributing factors of culture. Several 
of these cultural factors have been established by the failure 
literature. For example, the most common cultural factor 
involved organisations prioritising productivity over eth-
ics and safety. Such goal conflict is central to the theories 
of Perrow (1999), Reason (1990), and Rasmussen (1997). 
Where an underlying cause was provided, this goal conflict 
Fig. 4  The scaled distribu-
tion of causal cultural factors 
across ethical failures and safety 
failures
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was owing, as Perrow (1999) suggests, to factors of capital-
ism, including privatisation (Dien et al. 2004) and permis-
sive legislation (e.g. Behling et al. 2019). Yet, in a majority 
of cases it was not apparent why this goal conflict emerged. 
Perhaps, as Rasmussen (1997) suggests, organisations sys-
tematically move towards greater efficiency. Second, failure 
was preventable in a majority of case studies, but problems 
of corrective culture prevented the timely and effective res-
olution of issues. The distinction identified here, between 
those aspects of culture which cause failure and those which 
impede its aversion, adds to Rasmussen’s (1997) theory that 
organisations continually manage the boundaries of safety, 
Fig. 5  The scaled distribution 
of corrective cultural factors 
across ethical failures and safety 
failures
Fig. 6  The scaled distribution 
of seven cultural factors by 
outcome type
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economic failure, and workload. Causal culture pushes an 
organisation toward failure, creating disequilibrium. Correc-
tive culture pulls an organisation back from failure, main-
taining equilibrium. Third, most case studies described fail-
ure as arising from a sequential set of factors as described 
by the failure models of Reason (1990) and Turner (1978). 
Namely, cultural factors were not normally treated as being 
present or absent to varying degrees (Reason 2000), but as 
interacting with other cultural factors in dynamic ways. For 
example, inadequate regulation could lead to inadequate 
training, and inadequate training could lead to employees 
who feel unqualified to speak-up about problems and so 
remain silent. Dimensions of culture do not exist in isola-
tion from one another: problems in one dimension can pro-
duce problems in other dimensions. Where Reason (1990) 
suggests ‘safety culture’ both opens and closes institutional 
weaknesses, we suggest the ‘opening’ of weaknesses is 
achieved by causal factors of culture, whilst the ‘closing’ of 
weaknesses is achieved by corrective factors of culture. Only 
a minority of case studies did not report both causal and cor-
rective factors of culture, and thus we suggest that failure is 
characteristically preceded by both types of cultural factor. 
Namely, failure must involve at least one causal factor of 
culture which enables a problem to arise, and usually at least 
one corrective factor of culture which enables the problem to 
persist and develop into failure. This model needs to be sub-
stantiated with further research which explicitly identifies 
the causal and corrective cultural factors involved in failures.
Implications of this Review for the Constructs 
of Safety Culture and Ethical Culture
Large-scale failures are difficult to track prospectively using 
traditional methods. As such we sought to explore the pro-
posed role of safety culture and ethical culture in large-scale 
failures through a review of case study analyses. We found 
that the cultural factors identified in survey-based studies of 
safety culture and ethical culture overlap on 20 of the 23 cul-
tural factors implicated in failures. This establishes the role 
of safety culture and ethical culture in causing failure, which 
has not been substantially established. Yet, it is important 
to recognise that safety culture and ethical culture differ in 
terms of their motivations and consequences. Safety culture 
generally relates to the management of physical risk towards 
employees (e.g. occupational injuries) and organisational 
processes (e.g. an oil rig). A combination of regulatory fac-
tors, and the insight that safety failures are always damag-
ing to an organisation (e.g. in aviation), underlie the drive 
to have a culture that prioritises safety. Ethical culture is 
arguably more complex, because it relates to the upholding 
of both legal codes and what is regarded as morally accept-
able within a society. Ethical failure is defined by subjective 
and shifting beliefs about right and wrong (both within and 
outside an organisation), and can be less apparent. From this 
perspective, the outcomes of safety culture are more stable 
and objective than ethical culture, although both concepts 
attempt to capture the conflict that can arise in organisations 
through having goals that simultaneously emphasise perfor-
mance (e.g. productivity, profit) and avoiding risk-taking.
The three cultural factors involved in failure which are not 
normally included in existing models of safety culture and 
ethical culture were listening, homogeneity, and bullying. Of 
particular importance is listening which was disproportion-
ately linked to a loss of human life. Problems of listening 
occurred in more than a third of case studies and were nearly 
as prevalent as well-established preconditions to failure (e.g. 
procedural deviations, inadequate training). The problems 
of listening are disconcerting, particularly considering that 
speaking-up about problems often comes from a passion for 
the organisation (Kenny et al. 2020). Whilst Turner (1978, 
Turner and Pidgeon 1997) describes how communication 
problems could prevent individuals from seeing an imminent 
failure, these relate to variables of the message (e.g. clarity) 
and individual cognition. Problems of listening are different 
because the message is received, often repeatedly, but not 
acted upon because of a culturally-prescribed worldview or 
competing cultural factors. Further research into problems 
of listening is needed to identify predictive variables and 
possible measures to counteract them. For instance, drawing 
on Foucault, Catlaw et al. (2014) suggest the ability to listen 
and enact change in response to ‘parrhesia’ (i.e. information 
about problems) requires “a certain kind of relationship with 
ourselves that is grounded in an attentive examination of 
how we live our lives” (p. 199; original emphasis). In con-
trast to listening and bullying, homogeneity as a factor in 
failure has been highlighted before (Syed 2019), but further 
research is needed to understand homogeneity as a cultural 
phenomenon. In the case studies analysed here, bullying 
maintained unsafe or unethical norms by deterring employ-
ees from speaking-up about problems, and punishing those 
who did. As such bullying is particularly detrimental to cor-
rective culture because it fosters not only employee silence, 
but also fear. More research is needed to understand how 
bullying facilitates unsafe and unethical behaviour.
Differences in Failure and Outcome Types
All but one cultural factor occurred at least once in a failure 
of safety and ethics. This indicates that failures, irrespective 
of type and outcome, more-or-less stem from a common 
set of values and practises. There were a few discrepan-
cies. For example, ethical failures had more issues of cor-
rective culture, perhaps reflecting that they involve greater 
obfuscation than safety failures, although safety failures 
did involve more problems of listening and learning. Their 
overall overlap points to the need for an integrative model 
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which incorporates elements of both safety culture and ethi-
cal culture.
We also found that some cultural factors may be more 
conducive to specific outcomes. The largest discrepancies 
arose with seven cultural factors, including: homogeneity, 
listening, management, role-modelling, regulation, supervi-
sion, and training and policy. For example, loss of human 
life was more often preceded by listening problems such 
as management not listening to employees and wanting to 
hear their input. These findings indicate that specific out-
comes may tend to involve different combinations of cultural 
factors. They also signal the importance of these seven cul-
tural factors as areas for organisations to address.
Contextualising the Concept of Corrective Culture 
within the Wider Literature
Problems of corrective culture can be conceived in terms of 
what Argyris (1976) called ‘single loop learning’ in contrast 
to ‘double loop learning’ that enables large-scale correc-
tions. Organisations which engage in single loop learning 
favour control as their preferred ‘behavioural strategy’: they 
are characteristically defensive, and inhibit free choice and 
information. Problems which conflict with the organisation’s 
accepted views of itself are not normally reacted to, irre-
spective of whether they are detected. It is clear how every 
factor of corrective culture that we identified evinces this 
behavioural strategy in response to problems.
Corrective culture is also complementary to Westrum’s 
(2004, 2014) notion of information flow. Westrum (2004) 
suggests different culture-types exhibit different patterns of 
response to warning signals, ranging from the suppression 
and isolation of the message-sender (pathological culture) to 
the launch of a public inquiry to identify the root causes of a 
problem (generative culture). This review adds to Westrum’s 
(2004, 2014) model by cataloguing the values, beliefs, and 
practises which stifle information flow and obstruct meas-
ures to self-correct and avert failure.
Practical Implications of this Review
The findings of this review indicate that interventions to 
prevent failure, and evaluations of an organisation’s ability 
to prevent failure, should focus on corrective culture. An 
organisation will inevitably encounter problems of causal 
culture from time to time, but these will not develop into 
failure so long as the organisation is able to swiftly identify 
and appropriately deal with them.
Organisations can improve corrective culture through 
simulations, management, and introducing relevant cultural 
artefacts. Role-play simulations of bullying (e.g. amongst 
nurses, Ulrich et al. 2017), whistleblowing, and listening 
could be used to develop employees’ understanding of these 
corrective aspects of culture and readiness to deal with them. 
Managers could promote the value of corrective action by 
displaying an active interest in corrective culture, promot-
ing the occurrence of corrections and rewarding employees 
who have detected and raised problems (e.g. with social 
recognition). Corrective culture could also be improved 
by addressing relevant cultural artefacts. For example, an 
organisation could evaluate the effectiveness of its whistle-
blowing hotline.
Organisations might also assess their corrective culture 
through cultural measurement and testing whether the cor-
rective culture is working. Corrective culture could be meas-
ured by survey, with questions to assess employees’ confi-
dence in raising issues, whether employees are listened to 
when they do raise concerns, and the presence of recurring 
problems in an organisation. Unobtrusive indicators of cul-
ture (‘UICs’, Reader et al. 2020) could be used to assess the 
extent to which corrective culture manifests in artefacts and 
behaviours. For example, one could assess whether incident 
reports are recorded in the meeting minutes of the executive 
team or board, and if the organisation has a telephone num-
ber for customer service. Online customer reviews could be 
analysed for content related to factors of corrective culture 
(e.g. listening). Responding only to selected people is not 
a good indication of corrective culture, and so handling of 
complaints from outsiders (e.g. customers), employees, and 
management could be compared to establish selective listen-
ing. The volume of complaints received by an organisation 
could also be assessed: as shown in the incident reporting 
literature, a lack of complaints may reflect a poor corrective 
culture rather than a lack of problems.
Limitations
This review has some limitations which need be noted. First, 
case study research on culture and failure does not repre-
sent a coherent literature. This posed some challenges when 
developing search terms to identify qualifying publications. 
Given limited time and resources, search terms could not 
be as inclusive as originally planned because this yielded 
an unmanageable number of publications to screen. Sec-
ond, case studies vary in quality. For example, one third of 
case studies (n = 23) lack a methods section and thus do not 
identify their data sources at all, or name their data sources 
through in-text citation only. As such, more inclusive search 
terms and stricter criteria for exclusion could improve this 
review. Third, although 64% of the articles reviewed were 
published after 2010, the results of this review could be 
affected by its relatively high proportion of earlier articles. 
We find that, compared to earlier articles, those published 
after 2010 identify more problems of management, regu-
lation, and training and policy. As this difference is not 
accounted for by a substantial difference in the proportion 
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of safety failures (51.35%) and ethical failures (45.95%) ana-
lysed by more recent articles, it may reflect changing usages 
of safety culture and ethical culture concepts to analyse 
failure. Fourth, the results of this review could be affected 
by recurring cases (e.g. space shuttle disasters repeatedly 
involved listening problems).
Conclusion
There are several models of institutional failure and report-
based research on the aspects of safety culture and ethical 
culture associated with injuries, accidents, and wrongdo-
ing. We synthesised, for the first time, case studies which 
retrospectively investigate the relationship between culture 
and failure. We found that case studies combine models 
of failure and culture to explain these large-scale events. 
As case studies have the affordance of retrospect to iden-
tify ‘how’ failures unfold, we were able to see that culture 
manifests both as underlying causes of failure, as well as 
in organisational problems of dealing with problems (cor-
rective culture). We also found substantial overlap in the 
components of safety culture and ethical culture which case 
studies identified, adding weight to the application of these 
theoretical constructs to understanding failure. Finally, this 
review demonstrated that ethical failures such as accounting 
fraud and safety failures such as nuclear disasters are, for 
the most part, not distinguishable by the values and prac-
tises which preceded them. Indeed, failures often contain 
problems that cross the boundaries of both safety culture 
and ethical culture (e.g. speaking-up), indicating the need 
for a more integrative approach to studying adverse events. 
We propose that distinguishing causal and corrective culture, 
and conceptualising their sequential relations, can form the 
basis for such an integrative approach.
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Table 5  Information about organisations analysed by case studies
Article title Location Industry Employee  counta Total  revenueb
A marine accident analysing model to evaluate 
potential operational causes in cargo ships
N/Ac Industrials N/A N/A
Leadership discourse, culture, and corporate ethics: 
CEO-speak at News Corporation
United Kingdom Communication services N/A N/A
CEO speeches and safety culture: British Petroleum 
before the Deepwater Horizon disaster
Switzerland Energy 70,100 278b USD
What do gas blows, iron dust accumulations and 
sulfidation corrosion have in common?
United States of America Energy N/A N/A
United States of America Utilities N/A N/A
United States of America Materials N/A N/A
Safety culture and the issue of power United States of America Space exploration 16,351 26,354 m  USDd
Searching for the root causes of maritime casual-
ties—Individual competence or organisational 
culture?
United Kingdom Industrials N/A 334,107 k USD
United Kingdom Industrials 600 N/A
Accumulating trouble: Complex organization, a 
culture of silence, and a secret spill
United States of America Energy N/A 6,539 m USD
Aftermath of Fukushima: Avoiding another major 
nuclear disaster
Japan Utilities 41,086 6.3tn YEN
The 2018 Gosport Independent Panel report into 
deaths at the National Health Service’s Gosport 
War Memorial Hospital. Does the culture of the 
medical profession influence health outcomes?
United Kingdom Health care N/A N/A
What have we really learned? Twenty five years after 
Piper Alpha
United States of America Energy 14,400 21,232 m USD
Treating an unhealthy organisational culture: The 
implications of the Bundaberg Hospital Inquiry for 
managerial ethical decision making
Australia Health care N/A N/A
Corporate culture and frauds: A behavioral finance 
analysis of the Barclays-Libor case
United Kingdom Financials 87,369 21.63b GBP
If human errors are assumed as crimes in a safety 
culture: A lifeworld analysis of a rail crash
Japan Industrials 47,842 1529.3b YEN
Individual and contextual factors in ethical decision 
making: A case study of the most significant dop-
ing scandal in Canadian university sports history
Canada Professional sports 3,907 N/A
Understanding the organizational climate of unethi-
cal leadership in the Australian Football League
Australia Professional sports N/A 65,092,072 AUD
Criminalising institutional failures to prevent, iden-
tify or react to child sexual abuse
Australia Education N/A N/A
Factors causing Enron’s collapse: An investigation 
into corporate governance and company culture
United States of America Utilities 20,600 100,789 m USD
Organisational accidents investigation methodology 
and lessons learned
United Kingdom Industrials N/A N/A
United Kingdom Industrials N/A N/A
United Kingdom Industrials N/A N/A
United Kingdom Industrials N/A N/A
Why Lance Armstrong? Historical context and key 
turning points in the ’cleaning up’ of professional 
cycling
Mixed Professional sports N/A N/A
The evolving face of ethics in technical and profes-
sional communication: Challenger to Columbia
United States of America Space exploration 16,351 26,354 m  USDd
United States of America Space exploration 16,351 26,354 m  USDd
Corporate culture and greed—The case of the Aus-
tralian Wheat Board
Australia Consumer staples 400 N/A
The culture of objectivity: Quantification, uncer-
tainty, and the evaluation of risk at NASA
United States of America Space exploration 16,351 26,354 m  USDd
United States of America Space exploration 16,351 26,354 m  USDd
Root cause analysis of an old accident in an explo-
sives production plant
Czechoslovakia Materials N/A N/A
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Table 5  (continued)
Article title Location Industry Employee  counta Total  revenueb
The temptation of Houston: A case study of finan-
cialisation
United States of America Utilities 20,600 100,789 m USD
Applying systems thinking concepts in the analysis 
of major incidents and safety culture
Australia Industrials N/A N/A
Do businesses get the food poisoning they deserve? 
The importance of food safety culture
United Kingdom Consumer staples N/A N/A
The Columbia disaster: Culture, communication & 
change
United States of America Space exploration 16,351 26,354 m  USDd
Effects of internal rhetoric on management response 
to external issues: How corporate culture failed the 
asbestos industry
United States of America Materials N/A N/A
Studying organisational cultures and their effects on 
safety
Australia Military 14,125 N/A
Australia Industrials N/A N/A
The rise and fall of Carly Fiorina: An ethical case 
study
United States of America Information technology 55,000 58,500b USD
Case study: Volkswagen’s Diesel Emissions Scandal Germany Consumer discretionary 671,200 252,632 m EUR
Ethics, risk, and safety culture: Reflections on Fuku-
shima and beyond
Japan Utilities 41,086 6.3tn YEN
A systemic analysis of South Korea Sewol ferry 
accident—Striking a balance between learning and 
accountability
South Korea Industrials N/A N/A
Approach for safety culture evaluation under acci-
dent situation at NPPs; an exploratory study using 
case studies
Japan Utilities 41,086 6.3tn YEN
United States of America Utilities N/A N/A
The dynamics of corruptogenic organizations United States of America Financials N/A N/A
Agency theory, reasoning and culture at Enron: In 
search of a solution
United States of America Utilities 20,600 100,789 m USD
Lac-Mégantic accident: What we learned Canada Industrials N/A N/A
Safety culture in financial trading: An analysis of 
trading misconduct investigations
United Kingdom Financials N/A N/A
Tick a box, any box: A case study on the unintended 
consequences of system misuse in a hospital emer-
gency department
Australia Health care N/A N/A
Interpreting the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear incident: 
Some questions for corporate criminology
Japan Utilities 41,086 6.3tn YEN
Analysis of the Columbia shuttle disaster—Anatomy 
of a flawed investigation in a pathological organi-
zation
United States of America Space exploration 16,351 26,354 m  USDd
United States of America Space exploration 16,351 26,354 m  USDd
Lessons in organizational ethics from the Columbia 
disaster: Can a culture be lethal?
United States of America Space exploration 16,351 26,354 m  USDd
Just culture: A case study of accountability relation-
ship boundaries influence on safety in HIGH-
consequence industries
Switzerland Industrials N/A N/A
Case study: Volkswagen’s diesel emissions control 
scandal
Germany Consumer discretionary 671,200 252,632 m EUR
A systems approach to managing organizational 
integrity risks: Lessons from the 2014 Veterans 
Affairs waitlist scandal
United States of America Government 375,953 N/A
Learning from the Piper Alpha accident: A postmor-
tem analysis of technical and organizational factors
United States of America Energy 14,400 21,232 m USD
The ethical implications of altering public sector 
accountability models: The case of the Atlanta 
cheating scandal
United States of America Education N/A 777.4 m  USDd
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Table 5  (continued)
Article title Location Industry Employee  counta Total  revenueb
Whale watching on the trading floor: Unravelling 
collusive rogue trading in banks
United Kingdom Financials 87,369 21.63b GBP
United States of America Financials 200,000 74.3b USD
France Financials 142,000 20.153 m EUR
Germany Financials 37,266 23.2b  EURe
United Kingdom Financials 235,000 56,098 m USD
United Kingdom Financials 4860 1833 m GBP
United States of America Financials 200,000 55.9b USD
United Kingdom Financials 63,069 17.171 m GBP
Netherlands Financials 43,822 21,435 m EUR
United Kingdom Financials 64,397 18,429 m GBP
United Kingdom Financials 5200 2104b USD
France Financials 46,942 30,748
Switzerland Financials 69,966 28.9b USD
United States of America Financials 200,000 55.9b USD
Australia Financials 34,950 17,931 m AUD
Safety culture and accident analysis—A socio-man-
agement approach based on organizational safety 
social capital
United States of America Consumer discretionary 55,000 5b USD
The Deepwater Horizon explosion: Non-technical 
skills, safety culture, and system complexity
Switzerland Energy 70,100 278b USD
Achieving a safe culture: Theory and practice Ukraine Utilities N/A N/A
United Kingdom Military 38,550 N/A
Leaders as moral role models: The case of John 
Gutfreund at Salomon Brothers
United States of America Financials N/A N/A
Enron ethics (or: Culture matters more than codes) United States of America Utilities 20,600 100,789 m USD
The anatomy of corporate fraud: A comparative 
analysis of high profile American and European 
corporate scandals
United States of America Utilities 20,600 100,789 m USD
United States of America Consumer discretionary 40,000 3960b USD
Italy Consumer staples 26,000 6747.9 m USD
Netherlands Financials 114,000 49,695 m  EURf
France Consumer staples 44,641 15,898 m EUR
United States of America Communication services 62,700 32,202 m USD
Can we examine safety culture in accident investiga-
tions, or should we?
United States of America Government 35,000 9.31b USD
United States of America Industrials 10,269 2.9b USD
Charismatic leadership and corporate cultism at 
Enron: The elimination of dissent, the promotion 
of conformity and organizational collapse
United States of America Utilities 20,600 100,789 m USD
Information technology (IT) woes and intelligence 
agency failures: The Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion’s troubled IT evolution as a microcosm of a 
dysfunctional corporate culture
United States of America Government 35,000 9.31b USD
Three decades after Bhopal: What we have learned 
about effectively managing process safety risks
India Materials 11,569 N/A
a Employee count is last available number of employees
b Total revenue is last available full year value
c N/A indicates information was not available
d Value is last available annual budget given to a public organisation
e Value is last available full year net revenue
f Value is last available full year net sales
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